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U.S. Declassified Documents Online (USDD) - vorher unter dem Namen: Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS) - bietet Zugriff auf Dokumente, die von den US-Regierungsstellen freigegeben wurden. Die Datenbank enthält über 85.000 Dokumente mit einem Gesamtumfang von mehr als 525.000 Seiten. Es handelt sich um eine maßgebliche Quelle zu den Themen der amerikanischen Innen- und Außenpolitik nach dem 2. Weltkrieg und enthält u.a.: – Protokolle von Kabinetts-Sitzungen – Stellungnahmen des nationalen Sicherheitsrates – Untersuchungen der CIA – Material aus Konferenzen mit dem Präsidenten – Politische Analysen des Außenministeriums – Veröffentlichungen der Oberkommandeure der US-Streitmächte.

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  1. remove 1963 2.700
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    Air Defense for India [pros and cons to recommendation that the US and UK provide air forces in the event of a ChiCom attack on India and, in the interim, provide radar, communications, navigational aids and conduct intermittent peacetime air defense exercises in India using forces earmarked for deployment]. Memorandum, Dean Rusk, Secy of State, to the President. [Pencilled note: "For NSC Mtg. 5/9."] May 4, 1963. 6 p. Att: Legal Aspects of Proposed United States Participation in Air Defense Assistance to India. 3 p. SECRET. Declassified June 17, 1977. Johnson Library, Vice Presidential Security File, NSC, NSC.

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    [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. There was, and was not, a missile gap in early 1961, "depending on whether you included POLARIS or not; whether you were worried that the Air Force estimate might be right or not; whether you were thinking of a strategically significant gap or merely a comparison of raw numbers, regardless of the practical significance; and whether you were talking about something now or something we feared was coming." Because of the vagueness of the issue, Secy McNamara could not say anything to the press without being misleading, so he chose to say the "gap" did not exist.] Memorandum, Adam Yarmolinsky, Spec. Asst. to the Secy of Defense, to McGeorge Bundy, Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Nat. Security Affairs. Mar. 15, 1963. 2 p. SECRET. Declassified July 25, 1979. Kennedy Library, NSF, Subjects, Missile Gap, 2/63-5/63, Box 298.

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    [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] The Missile Gap Controversy [the National Intelligence Estimates that predicted the Soviets would have up to 500 ICBM's operational by 1962 were based on extremely fragmentary evidence. As information was gained indicating the Soviets were cutting back on the development of first-generation missiles to work on improved versions, the estimated deployment dropped from 500 in 1957 to be ween 35 and 50 in 1962. Although the "missile gap" fears were justifiable in the context of the larger debate over whether the US was making an adequate response to the Soviet threat, the "gap" did not develop]. Memorandum, Robert S. McNamara, Secy of Defense, to the President. Mar. 4, 1963. 5 p. TOP SECRET. SANITIZED copy. Released July 25, 1979. Kennedy Library, NSF, Subjects, Missile Gap, 2/63-5/63, Box 298.

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    Pakistan, General Maxwell Taylor's Visit to, December 1963 [background and goal of Azores and South Africa and in Libya, Ethiopia, and Morocco. Therefore, in determining its position on UN resolutions calling for severe measures against Portugal and South Africa, the US must try to avoid alienating either side; that is, the US should state its objections to apartheid and Portuguese colonial policies while avoiding a pro-African bloc vote in favor of sanctions, embargo, or expulsion of Portugal and South Africa.] Memorandum, Robert S. McNamara, Secy of Defense, to Dean Rusk, Secy of State. July 11, 1963. 2 p Att: US Policy toward Portugal and Republic of South Africa (U) [importance of Azores bases, Portuguese participation in NATO, South African seaports and airfields, communications sites in North Africa, and Wheelus Air Base in Libya]. Memorandum, JCSM-528-63, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman, JCS, for the Secy of Defense. July 10, 1963. 4 p.; App. to Att: not enclosed. SECRET. SANITIZED copy. Released Nov. 30, 1978 to July 19, 1979. Johnson Library, NSF, Countries, Portugal, General, Briefing for Meeting, July 18, 1963, Box 154.

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    [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. There was, and was not, a missile gap in early intelligence and defense thinking leading to the prediction of a "missile gap" are further analyzed. US aims, changes in defense posture, NIE's, the Gaither Report, and missile development are summarized, and the changes leading to the downward revision of Soviet missile strength and the actual rise in US missile strength are outlined]. Memorandum, Lawrence C. McQuade, Spec. Asst. to the Asst. Secy of Defense, International Security Affairs, to Paul H. Nitze, Asst. Secy of Defense, International Security Affairs. May 31, 1963. 25 p. App: Operational Soviet ICBM Launchers [full range of estimates by USIB members from Feb. 1960-Feb. 1963]. 1 p. TOP SECRET. Declassified July 25, 1979. Kennedy Library, NSF, Subjects, Missile Gap, 2/63-5/63, Box 298.

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    Rumanian-American Relations [regarding CEMA, the Rumanians noted nothing can be done by CEMA without unanimous approval of members. Harriman noted that recent signs of Rumanian independence of Moscow met with an approving reaction among Americans, and it might be possible for the US to be more receptive to Rumanian trade requests. The Rumanians spoke at length of the importance not only of increased trade but of signs of response to requests to purchase industrial installations]. Memorandum of Conversation [W. Averell Harriman, Under Secy of State for Political Affairs, US; William A. Crawford, Min. to Bucharest, US; Harold C. Vedeler, East European Affairs, State Dept., US; Rumanian officials deleted]. Aug. 8, 1963. 2 p. CONFIDENTIAL. SANITIZED copy. Released Mar. 13, 1979. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries, Rumanian, General, 8/7/63-8/22/63, Box 155.

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    Rumanian-American Relations [regarding CEMA, the Rumanians noted nothing can be his appreciation for previous day's luncheon with Gov. Harriman. He would be delaying his return to Bucharest and would like to make further precisions to Harriman. He would like to identify fields in addition to petrochemicals in which the Rumanians would like to buy US know-how and installations. In the forthcoming exchange of petroleum delegations, the Rumanians would like to have their Minister of Petroleum and Chemical Industry, and perhaps another minister, head their delegation]. Memorandum of Conversation [William A. Crawford, Min. to Bucharest, US; Mirces Malita, Foreign Min., Rumania; Petre Balaceanu, Min., Rumania]. Aug. 9, 1963. 2 p. CONFIDENTIAL. Declassified Mar. 13, 1979. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries, Rumania, General, 8/7/63-8/22/63, Box 155.

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    [Rumania] Gheorghiu-Dej Seeks Sign of US Support [Dej has made a plea to Secy Freeman for relaxation of US export controls. Rumania seeks a tangible sign from the US in support of its nationalistic policy. Dej has asked that Pres. Kennedy be informed of Rumania's interest in buying industrial installations from the US. Only licensing is needed; this is seen as a meaningful gesture that the President could make which does not require legislative action. The Rumanians want to find out where the US stands. Dej does not consider CEMA capable of restricting Rumania's economic freedom of action]. Intelligence Note, Thomas L. Hughes, Dir., Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to the Acting Secy of State. Aug. 10, 1963. 2 p. CONFIDENTIAL. Declassified Mar. 13, 1979. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries, Rumania, General, 8/7/63-8/22/63, Box 155.

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    Laos, Policy Implications of Developments in [there are three situations that might evolve: continued local action in which the Pathet Lao would continue to try to capitalize on neutralist divisions; a proliferation of Pathet Lao moves in eastern Xieng Khouang Province and perhaps elsewhere in order to undermine Kong Le's main forces in the western Plaine des Jarres and promote defeatism and defections; PL action against Kong Le's headquarters near the Plaine des Jarres. The bloc states appear willing to condone PL efforts to subvert and weaken the neutralist military and political position. The US must try to stabilize the situation without allowing Pathet Lao gains and to preserve the neutralists as an independent political factor. If the Communists move to swallow up additional Kong Le outposts or are preparing to assault Kong Le's main forces, the US might consider intensification of its present actions, reinforcement of Kong Le's forces with Phoumi units, increased Meo harassing activities, movement of elements of the Seventh Fleet toward the Gulf of Siam, additional intelligence efforts, and actions to secure international support for US position]. Memorandum, Thomas L. Hughes, Dir., Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to the Acting Secy of State. Apr. 10, 1963. 6 p. SECRET. NO FORN. SANITIZED copy. Released Aug. 25, 1978. Johnson Library, Vice Presidential Security File, Govt. Agencies, State Dept., 1961-1963.

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    Philippines, Visit of President Johnson to the Republic of the, October 23-27, 1966 Africa [Portugal is the only European nation that still clings to important segments of its colonial empire. Unless some means of orderly transition is developed, Angola, Mozambique, and others will break free by some means. The Soviet bloc can be expected to participate in the resulting struggle. US diplomacy should at least try to strengthen moderate forces in Portugal and Africa and create a common front with NATO allies. At best, it should lay the basis for a rational and constructive solution. A policy should first maintain the confidence of key non-Communist leaders in Angola and Mozambique and second, bring a change of attitude by the Portuguese themselves. The US should present Portugal with a proposal offering substantial and rapid economic progress for Metropolitan Portugal and simultaneous development of the overseas territories moving toward early self-determination. It is less than probable that Salazar will agree to such an approach. Even if rejected, it will have dramatized the existence of an honorable alternative for Portugal. It is recommended that the President set up a working committee to explore methods by which cooperative relations with non-Communist leaders in the colonies can be maintained, to put together a concrete proposal for discussion to present to Portugal and US allies, and to devise a promising means of presenting proposals to the Portuguese]. Memorandum, Chester Bowles, Under Secy of State, to Dean Rusk, Secy of State. Jan. 10, 1963. 9 p. SECRET. Declassified Feb. 23, 1978. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries, Portugal, General, Box 154A.

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    [United Kingdom] Possible Successors to UK Labor Leader Gaitskell [Harold Wilson is the likeliest successor; George Brown is the other leading contender. Brown is considered friendlier to US interests. If both prove unacceptable to the party, a less controversial figure, such as James Callaghan, may be chosen. Brown is a leading figure in the moderate Gaitskell wing; he is a nondoctrinaire right-wing trade unionist who has opposed unilateral disarmament and old-fashioned nationalization in the 1960 debates. Wilson has supported disarmament and nationalization. He has tried to unseat Gaitskell but failed in the first such challenge to a party leader in nearly 40 years. Brown favors UK entry into the EEC; Wilson is veering toward opposition. Both opposed the Skybolt deal and an independent nuclear deterrent. If either wins, there could be another split in the party, undercutting Labour's chances to beat the Conservatives]. Research Memorandum, REU-5, Thomas L. Hughes, Dir., Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to the Secy of State. Jan. 17, 1963. 2 p. CONFIDENTIAL. NO FOREIGN DISSEM. SANITIZED copy. Released Mar. 12, 1979. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries, UK, General, Jan. 11-29, 1963, Box 171.

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    [United Kingdom] Possible Successors to UK Labor Leader Gaitskell [Harold Wilson is articles associated with granting of honorary US citizenship. Churchill has been excited and gratified by the honor, which has inspired "one of the great emotions of his later years."] Am Emb London, Telegram No. 3958, for the President and Acting Secretary from Bruce. Apr. 11, 1963. 2 p. CONFIDENTIAL. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION. Declassified Mar. 27, 1979. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries, UK, General, Churchill Citizenship, 9/62-4/63, Box 171.

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    [Brazil. Finance Minister Pinto's policy inclinations presently include postponing any major financial discussions with the US or IMF, negotiating with major creditors individually, restricting imports to minimize balance of payments pressures, and reversing inflation by increasing revenue collections. The US should attempt to influence Brazil in two areas: establish a realistic exchange rate policy to increase Brazilian "self-help" and reverse the negative policy on foreign investment.] Am Emb Rio de Janeiro, Telegram No. 506. 2 Sections. Sept. 9, 1963. 5 p. SECRET. LIMIT DISTRIBUTION. Declassified Jan. 27, 1977. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries, Brazil, Vol. III, 9/1/63-9/31/63.

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    [Brazil. The best chances for arresting present political and economic deterioration lie in the possible move by the military or another group to force Goulart to resign or in a temporary take-over by the military.] Am Emb Rio de Janeiro, Telegram No. 667, for Asst. Secy Martin. Sept. 25, 1963. 2 p. SECRET. Declassified Jan. 27, 1977. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries, Brazil, Vol. III, 9/1/63-9/31/63.

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    [France. Gen. Pierre Gallois (not a government official) describes to an embassy officer the technical difficulties and slippage encountered by France in constructing its deterrent force. Gallois says the force de frappe is a mirage; it is not credible. France lacks the resources to compete with the superpowers, but US policy has left de Gaulle no choice but to try to forge a force. If the US would make a gesture to remove the discrimination France is subjected to under the MacMahon Act, France would be content to be a secondary nuclear power.] Am Emb Paris, Telegram No. 3977. Apr. 2, 1963. 3 p. CONFIDENTIAL. Declassified Mar. 28, 1978. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries, France, General, Reports and Memos, Mar.-May 1963, Part II.

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